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FREELY FORMING GROUPS: TRYING TO BE RARE
MICHAEL BAAKE, UWE GRIMM, AND HARALD JOCKUSCH
Abstract. A simple weakly frequency dependent model for the dynamics of a population
with a finite number of types is proposed, based upon an advantage of being rare. In
the infinite population limit, this model gives rise to a non-smooth dynamical system that
reaches its globally stable equilibrium in finite time. This dynamical system is sufficiently
simple to permit an explicit solution, built piecewise from solutions of the logistic equation
in continuous time. It displays an interesting tree-like structure of coalescing components.
1. Introduction
Imagine a large, but finite population of N individuals, with N fixed. Imagine further
that they are divided into M disjoint groups, of type i and size ni > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ M , so that
n1 + . . .+nM = N . Let us assume that there is an advantage in belonging to a smaller group,
but that changing the group is only reasonable if individuals from different groups meet. As
a justification for this setting, we envision that each individual might only know the size of
its own group, but not necessarily the size of any other one. Consequently, a comparison
requires the exchange of information. For simplicity, we assume honesty in this process.
To specify the dynamics, we assume that, at a fixed rate (which we may choose to be 1
for simplicity), two individuals chosen at random from the entire population meet and act
according to the following protocol. If both are from the same group, or from groups of the
same size, no action is taken; otherwise, the individual from the larger group joins the smaller
one, by changing type accordingly. We assume that the advantage depends on group size
only, not on type. Note that a situation where nj = ni + 1 is changed into ni = nj + 1 is
overall neutral, and also neutral from the point of view of the acting individual.
In this short note, we consider the resulting dynamics in the deterministic limit as N →∞,
with a fixed number of types. This approach is appropriate because the protocol is determin-
istic, and no extinction can occur in the finite size situation. Therefore, no stochastic effects
of relevance are possible. Consequently, we shall look at the deterministic time evolution of
the corresponding (discrete) probability distribution {pi | 1 ≤ i ≤ M} of the types. This
setting is known as the infinite population limit (IPL), compare [6, Ch. 11.2] for background
material and [2, 14, 10] for recent examples. For a finite population, pi = ni/N are the type
frequencies. The model thus shows a frequency dependence, which is weak in the sense that
only the signs of the differences pi − pj matter, but not their magnitudes.
This approach leads to a simple, but rather interesting system of nonlinear ODEs, with
discontinuous right-hand side. The latter property requires some care concerning the concepts
of a solution and of an equilibrium, since the standard results of ODE theory do not directly
apply. However, this will cause no problem in our case, where we shall see that the globally
stable equilibrium, p1 = . . . = pM = 1/M , is reached in finite time from any initial condition
in the interior of the probability simplex (see below for details).
Our simple example is illustrative in the sense that a biologically relevant, non-smooth
dynamical system can be looked at and solved explicitly, without invoking the general theory
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[8] or resorting to abstract results [5]. In fact, to derive the solution, one only needs a
good understanding of the logistic equation in continuous time, compare [1, Ch. 1]. In our
multi-dimensional system, the solution curves of the various components display a tree-like
coalescing structure. The corresponding coalescing times are the relevant time scales that
would also show up in smooth approximations of this non-smooth dynamical system (where
they appear as the characteristic times of the exponential closing-in of the components).
The model is a toy example of game theoretic flavour, compare [11], where a key ingredient
is the use of non-local information (the group sizes). As such, it can be considered as a
model of population dynamics [11, 4], but is rather different from the standard models of
population genetics, compare [3, 7]. As possible applications, one could think of population
patches (spatial advantage), food specialisation (supply advantage), advertising strategies
(promotional advantage) or name choosing (recognisability), to name but a few.
Similar models, and also more general ones, have been investigated in mathematical game
theory. One early example is the ideal free distribution of Fretwell and Lucas in ecology [9],
which describes the spatial distribution of a population among a fixed number of resource
patches. This is related to the evolutionary stable strategies of game theory, see [4] for
a detailed discussion. Various dynamics, including imitation and replicator dynamics, are
considered in this context, compare the excellent review by Hofbauer and Sigmund [12] with
its extensive bibliography.
Even though our model can be seen as a special case of imitation dynamics, compare [11,
Sec. 8.1] and [12, Sec. 3.2], it results from a specific finite size model via the infinite population
limit, and is thus fixed. Since we see this as a first step towards more realistic models including
stochastic and finite-size effects, we find it slightly more natural to use the classic notions of
dynamical systems rather than to formulate the model and its solution in the language of
game theory (we shall give the translation below for comparison).
2. The dynamical systems and their equilibria
The reservoir of types, or state space, is {1, . . . , M}, i.e., there are finitely many different
states. In the IPL limit [6, 2, 14], one considers the deterministic time evolution of probability
vectors p = (p1, . . . , pM ) with pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1, where pi is the proportion of the (infinite)
population in state i. For the model described above, with p = p(t), this gives the system of
ODEs
(1) p˙m =
∑
n
pmpn sgn(pn − pm)
where sgn is the signum function, i.e.,
sgn(x) =


1, x > 0
0, x = 0
−1, x < 0 .
More generally, one could consider the ODEs
(2) p˙m =
∑
n
pmpn ϕ(pn − pm)
where ϕ : [−1, 1] −→ R is an odd function (i.e., ϕ(−x) = −ϕ(x)) that is continuous, or (as
sgn above) piecewise continuous with only finitely many jumps. In particular, ϕ(0) = 0.
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In general, such discontinuities require solutions to be defined accordingly, e.g., in the sense
of Filippov [8, §4], thus referring to the well developed theory of ODEs with discontinuous
right-hand sides. Fortunately, and not untypically for models with a biological context, one
can introduce all ingredients required for our model in an elementary way. Moreover, one can
make most results explicit, thus illustrating aspects usually obtained by qualitative theory.
Let us first assume that ϕ is continuous. Then, the forward flow of the dynamical system
(2) leaves the cone of positive vectors invariant, which follows from the observation that
pm(t) = 0 implies p˙m(t) = 0, together with standard arguments from [1, Ch. 16]. Since
ϕ(0) = 0, one also finds
∑
m,n
pmpn ϕ(pn − pm) =
∑
m<n
pmpn
(
ϕ(pn − pm) + ϕ(pm − pn)
)
= 0,
whence ddt(p1 + . . . + pM ) = 0 and total mass is preserved. In particular, the forward flow of
(2) preserves the simplex of probability vectors, PM := {p ∈ R
M | pi ≥ 0 and
∑
i pi = 1}.
This is in line with the probabilistic interpretation chosen above.
In an appropriate generalisation, this remains true for the dynamical system (1) with
its discontinuous right-hand side. In general, this claim requires some care, and is usually
substantiated by viewing the ODE (1) within the scheme of so-called differential inclusions,
where one considers equations of the form p˙n ∈ F (t, p) with set-valued right-hand sides [13,
Sec. 2], see also [12, Sec. 3.3] for its appearance in game theory, e.g., in the context of the
so-called best response dynamics. For our system (1), the function sgn(x) would simply be
replaced by the set-valued function Sgn, defined by Sgn(x) = {sgn(x)} for x 6= 0 together with
Sgn(0) = [−1, 1], compare [13, Ex. 2.1.1]. Since our system is autonomous and well-behaved,
it is then essentially straight-forward, following [13, Thms. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2], to establish the
existence and uniqueness result for its solution in forward time. Fortunately, Eq. (1) permits
a much simpler approach, based directly on the single-valued function sgn(x).
Clearly, solutions of (1) can no longer be expected to be differentiable everywhere. The
starting point is then the class of absolutely continuous functions, which are differentiable
almost everywhere. A solution of our ODE (1) is then a function of this class that satisfies
(1) almost everywhere. As we shall see explicitly below, the solutions of (1) are actually
piecewise smooth, with only finitely many points of non-differentiability (coinciding with the
coalescence points of components). More precisely, at the glueing points, the value of the
previous segment provides the initial value for the next. It will always be evident that this
construction yields the unique solution.
In what follows, we shall only consider the dynamical system restricted to the probability
simplex PM . Moreover, we mainly consider initial values from its interior, because otherwise,
in view of the right-hand side of (1), we could start with a smaller state space right away, i.e.,
with a probability simplex of smaller dimension. In this sense, the restriction to the interior
of PM covers all cases, by suitable choice of M .
The equilibria of our systems (1) or (2) certainly include the uniform distribution on
{1, . . . , M} or that on any subset of it. These correspond to the centre of the simplex PM or
to the centre of some boundary of it, the latter effectively being a simplex PM ′ with M
′ < M .
Further equilibria can exist if ϕ(x) has zeros other than x = 0. However, we are primarily
interested in stable equilibria, such as pi ≡ 1/M for (1). In fact, the latter is even globally
stable, meaning that any initial condition from the interior of PM will converge, under the
forward flow, to this equilibrium, compare [12, Sec. 2.2] for a brief discussion of these concepts.
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Let us briefly expand on this point. Observing that both models (1) and (2) can be viewed
as special cases of imitation dynamics in game theory (with the negative identity matrix
being the payoff matrix, compare [11, Eq. 8.3]), one can derive that they possess a Lyapunov
function, subject to certain conditions on the function ϕ. This can also be seen explicitly as
follows. If we define f(t) :=
∑
m
(
pm(t)
)2
, a simple double summation argument using (2)
shows that
(3) f˙ = −
∑
m,n
pmpn (pn − pm) ϕ(pn − pm) .
Consequently, as all pm ≥ 0, f˙(t) ≤ 0 if ϕ is a non-decreasing odd function (note that x ϕ(x)
is then even and ≥ 0).
If x = 0 is the only zero of ϕ(x) and p(t) a point in the interior of PM , one has f˙(t) < 0
unless p(t) is the centre of PM . This establishes f as a strict Lyapunov function for the
interior of PM in these cases, see [1] for details on this concept. This observation establishes
the global stability result of the equilibrium point p1 = . . . = pM = 1/M , both for (1) and
(2). The hierarchy of boundaries of PM can be treated separately, by identifying them with
appropriate cases of smaller dimension.
3. Solution of the case M = 2
Let us consider Eq. (1) for M = 2. Setting p1 = p and p2 = q = 1 − p, it is clear that it
now suffices to consider the single ODE
(4) p˙ = p(1− p) sgn(1− 2p) .
If p(t) < 1/2, this simplifies to p˙ = p(1 − p), which is the well-known logistic equation in
continuous time, compare [1, Ch. 1]. It has the solution
p(t) =
1
1 + αe(t0−t)
with α =
1− p(t0)
p(t0)
.
If the initial condition of (4) is 0 < p(t0) < 1/2, this formula also provides the solution we
need, until p(t) reaches the value 1/2, whereupon the solution continues as p(t) ≡ 1/2 — the
globally stable equilibrium. As is not untypical of ODEs with discontinuous right-hand sides,
compare [8, §15], this happens after a finite time, namely at
t1 = t0 + log
1− p(t0)
p(t0)
= t0 + log(α).
Similarly, if p(t) > 1/2, Eq. (4) simplifies to p˙ = −p(1− p). Provided that 1 > p(t0) > 1/2,
the solution now is
p(t) =
1
1 + αe(t−t0)
,
with α as before, until p(t) hits 1/2 from above. This happens at time
t2 = t0 + log
p(t0)
1− p(t0)
= t0 − log(α).
In this rather simple case, q = 1− p, and the complete solution is thus given in closed form,
with one coalescence point at time t1 or t2, depending on the initial condition. If α = 1 (i.e.,
p(t0) = 1/2), t1 = t2 = t0, and one is in the equilibrium from the very beginning.
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4. Some comments on the general structure
If M > 2, one can simplify the situation enormously by assuming, without loss of generality,
that the initial condition is non-degenerate (meaning that all types occur) and ordered, so
that
(5) 0 < p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pM < 1 .
If the pi are all equal, we must have pi ≡ 1/M , i.e., we are (and stay) in equilibrium. So, let
us assume that at least one further inequality sign is proper, and that the leftmost position
where this happens is between ` and ` + 1. In other words,
0 < p1 = . . . = p` < p`+1 ≤ . . . ≤ pM < 1 .
Since
∑
j pj = 1, one then has
∑M
j=`+1 pj = 1 − `pi, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ `. Then, a short
calculation with Eq. (1) shows that the time evolution of all pi with 1 ≤ i ≤ ` is identical,
and given by the ODE
(6) p˙ = p(1− `p) ,
as long as p` < p`+1 remains true. This variant of the logistic equation has the solution
p(t) =
1
` + βe(t0−t)
with β =
1
p(t0)
− ` .
In general, the situation can be described as follows. Whatever the initial condition is, one
can bring it to the standard form (5), by a permutation of the types. In forward time, the
ordering then remains that way. Step by step, two or more neighbouring pi coalesce, all in
finite time, until the equilibrium is reached (also in finite time). With increasing M , there is a
growing number of different possibilities for the emerging coalescent trees of components (not
to be mixed up with the result of the well-known coalescent process from population genetics,
compare [3, 7]), which makes a closed formula for the solution cumbersome. The general
picture, however, is rather intuitive, and will become evident from the explicit solution for
M = 3.
5. Solution of the case M = 3
Let us consider our system (1) for M = 3 and assume
0 < p1 < p2 < p3 < 1
in order to exclude any degenerate situation. It is clear that we now have three different
coalescent trees to distinguish, see Figure 1.
The system of ODEs now reads
(7) p˙1 = p1(1− p1) , p˙2 = p2(p3 − p1) , p˙3 = −p3(1− p3) .
With αi = (1− pi(t0))/pi(t0), the solutions p1 and p3 start as
(8) p1(t) =
1
1 + α1e
(t0−t)
, p3(t) =
1
1 + α3e
(t−t0)
while the solution for p2 can be obtained from here by insertion and elementary integration,
(9) p2(t) = p2(t0)
(1 + α1)(1 + α3)
(1 + α1e
(t0−t))(1 + α3e
(t−t0))
.
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Figure 1. Examples of the non-degenerate classes of solutions for M = 3.
The solutions
(
p1(t), p2(t), p3(t)
)
are drawn on top of each other, against time
on the horizontal axis. Initial conditions at t0 = 0 are, from left to right,
(0.22, 0.28, 0.5), (0.2, 0.3, 0.5) and (0.2, 0.32, 0.48). The equilibrium ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3) is
reached at t = log(2) in all three cases. In the left (right) frame, the first
coalescence happens at t = log( 1711) (at t = log(
12
7 )).
These solutions remain valid until p1 meets with p2 or p2 with p3 (whatever is first), or both
(if they coincide). A simple calculation gives the coalescing times
t12 = t0 + log
(
1 +
p2 − p1
p1(p1 + p2)
)
and t23 = t0 − log
(
1−
p3 − p2
p3(p2 + p3)
)
,
where the pi are to be read as pi(t0).
If t12 = t23, all three curves pi(t) coalesce in one point, (
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3). From here, the solution
is then pi(t) ≡
1
3 , the globally stable equilibrium of this situation, see the middle example in
Figure 1. This happens if and only if the initial conditions satisfy
(10) p2 =
3p1(1− p1)
1 + 3p1
in addition to p1 + p2 + p3 = 1.
Otherwise, we have to distinguish the cases t12 < t23 and t12 > t23 (which correspond to
replacing equality in Eq. (10) by < or >, respectively). In the former case, the above solutions
for p1(t) and p2(t) are valid until t = t12. Afterwards, p12(t) = p1(t) = p2(t) satisfies Eq. (6)
with ` = 2, and solution
p12(t) =
1
2 + βe(t12−t)
, with β =
1
p1(t12)
− 2 .
The solution for p3(t) from (8) remains valid until it meets with p12(t), which happens at
t12|3 = t0 + log
2p3(t0)
1− p3(t0)
.
This time can easily be calculated from the condition p3(t12|3) =
1
3 .
In the remaining case, t12 > t23, we have
p23(t) =
1
2 + βe(t−t23)
, with β =
1
p3(t23)
− 2 ,
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after p2(t) and p3(t) met at t = t23, until p23(t) meets with p1(t) given in Eq. (8) at time
t1|23 = t0 + log
1− p1(t0)
2p1(t0)
,
obtained from the condition p1(t1|23) =
1
3 . Figure 1 shows a representative example, from
which the general situation is clear.
6. Concluding Remarks
Equilibria of smooth dynamical systems are usually reached only asymptotically. The
above toy model does so in finite time, which is a consequence of the discontinuous right-hand
side of (1). If the latter were replaced by a smooth approximation (e.g., a sigmoid curve),
neighbouring lines would no longer meet in finite time, but close in exponentially fast instead
– otherwise, the qualitative picture remains the same. In particular, if (2) is considered
with an odd function ϕ that is strictly monotonically increasing (hence including sigmoid
curves), the nature of the globally stable equilibrium remains unchanged. An advantage of
the discontinuous system is its exact solvability, including the calculation of all relevant time
scales.
As to the relevance of our findings for large, but finite systems, fluctuations can lead to
violations of the order relation (5). However, it is clear that the convergence to the equilibrium
qualitatively remains the same if N is a multiple of M . Otherwise, the equilibrium is reached
up to fluctuations of at most one individual per group, i.e., of order 1/N . This mirrors the
deviations from the expectation values (over all realisations of the stochastic process), the
latter coinciding with the equilibrium of the IPL limit in this simple case.
It might be interesting to extend the above model by means of a stochastic (rather than
deterministic) protocol, and to compare it with related models of game theory [11, 4]. This will
automatically lead to various extension and generalisations. To reach a more complete and
realistic picture, it will be necessary to develop a proper stochastic frame and to investigate
relevant finite size effects by suitable simulations, see also [12] for a brief discussion of these
issues. These two aspects will certainly require more attention in the future.
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